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Professor Hudec and the Appellate Body  
Ricardo Ramirez* 
GATT dispute settlement will probably always teeter on the edge of 
crisis, for there will always be a tendency to use it to cover up subs-
tantive failures. I like to believe, however, that if GATT dispute set-
tlement keeps its balance for another forty years, Governments may 
end up creating an effective litigation procedure in spite of them-
selves. 
Robert E. Hudec1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I met Professor Hudec only once. September 1997. It was 
during a NAFTA panel hearing in the broom corn brooms case. 
He was a panelist in that case. In fact, he was chosen by Mexico 
to serve in that dispute. According to the NAFTA’s “crossed se-
lection” mechanism, a party to a dispute gets to choose panel-
ists who are nationals of the other party.2 At that time, I was a 
junior attorney in the office of the General Counsel at the Mex-
ican Ministry of Economy, I had to do the research for panelists 
selection among American trade lawyers. To be sincere, I don’t 
remember very much of the result of that research. The only 
thing I do remember was that one of the reasons behind Profes-
sor Hudec’s selection was his impeccable reputation as a fair-
minded person and as one of the founders of the American in-
ternational trade law doctrine.  
So, there I was in front of him, listening to his questioning 
 
* Professor of international trade law at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma 
de Mexico. Member, Appellate Body, 2009-2013. The views expressed in this 
speech should not be interpreted as expressing a particular position taken by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the WTO Appellate Body. Moreover, 
the views in this article should not be interpreted as endorsing or rejecting 
any of Professor Robert E. Hudec views on any aspect of international trade 
law. I wish to thank Alan Yanovich and Christian Vidal León for their helpful 
comments. 
 1.  Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on 
the Nature of Litigation Between Governments 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 226 
(1987). 
 2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,32 I.L.M. 289, 
605 (1993). 
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and feeling somewhat overwhelmed by the whole scene. Bear in 
mind that this was in fact the very first trade case handled by a 
group of young and inexperienced Mexican attorneys. At that 
time, GATT/WTO disputes were handled by the Mexican Mis-
sion in Geneva, so this was our very first trial and actually the 
first time Mexico was participating in a NAFTA dispute.  
Maybe this feeling was the reason which prevented me 
from approaching him when that hearing ended. This was my 
only chance and alas, turned out to be my last chance to have a 
chat with him. This is why when Professor Shaffer very kindly 
invited me to participate in this gathering, it gave me the per-
fect opportunity, since I was coming to his alma mater, to go 
through his work again and pay a very humble tribute to a 
great international trade law scholar. 
As I reviewed his work, a lot of adjectives were used to de-
scribe him. Professor Davey called him “the role model of what 
an academic should be”3; Professor Trachtman stated that he 
was the “pioneering empiricist of international trade law”4; Pro-
fessor Jackson called him a “consummate legal professional”5. 
But the more I reflect on it, the more I come to the conclu-
sion that the word that best describes him is “honest.” Accord-
ing to the Oxford shorter dictionary, honest means “free of de-
ceit and untruthfulness; sincere”6. Professor Hudec was an 
honest person. As far as I can tell, Professor Hudec did not be-
lieve in “mantras,” he had the honesty to accept or modify his 
views according to the reality at hand or simply accept when 
his ideas were wrong.  
He always tried to find balance between diplomacy and the 
rule of law. Between law and economy reality. This is evidenced 
by the fact that his work continues to be an essential reference 
in many topics. In this brief journey through Hudec’s work, I 
will try to touch upon some of the key aspects of his interna-
tional trade work.  
II. AIM AND EFFECTS DOCTRINE 
On substance, one has to start with his aim and effects test 
 
 3. John A. Jackson et. al., Tribute to Robert E. Hudec, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
729, 740 (2003). 
 4. Id. at 743. 
 5. Id. at 730. 
 6. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 1534 (5th ed. 2002). 
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or doctrine with regard to the concept of “like product.”7 In my 
view, the best example of Hudec’s thinking or approach to-
wards the concept of like product is his description of actions 
taken by the United States during the Chicken war, when he 
describes in one of his papers that, when he was a U.S. official 
during the Chicken War the United States raised tariffs for 
brandy, clearly directed to France by including a tariff heading 
of “brandy of more than 9 dollars per gallon.”8 In this regard, 
Hudec asks: “[w]hy would GATT permit governments to do in-
directly (discrimination-by-product-distinction) what prohibits 
them doing directly (origin specific discrimination)?”9 
 The most telling indication that his work in this area 
remains an important reference is that some authors continue 
to debate whether or not every new report from a WTO panel or 
the Appellate Body comes closer or departs from this concept.10 
It is also telling that his legacy in this respect went beyond the 
like product concept and contributed to the discussion of other 
aspects of trade law beyond GATT Article III, such as GATT 
Article I, intellectual property or technical barriers to trade.11  
Despite the importance and longevity of the like product 
concept, I believe Hudec’s most important contribution of the 
aim and effects doctrine is his introduction of the notion of the 
application of economic concepts to the rule of law. I am sure 
that if he were still with us, he would want to expand the appli-
cability of this notion to every aspect of international trade.  
I understand that this was not Professor Hudec’s only con-
tribution to the substance of international trade law. For in-
stance, Gary Horlick mentions that he is the “unacknowledged 
father of the most important single concept in the WTO Subsi-
 
 7.  Robert Hudec, Like Product: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Ar-
ticles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 105 (Thomas Cottier & Petros Ma-
vroidis eds., 2000). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. See Roessler Frieder, Beyond the Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor 
Robert E. Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of Products 
under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 771-781 (2003). 
 11. See Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachmann, Robert Hudec and Domestic 
Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 783 
(2003); T.N. Srinivasan, Nondiscrimination in GATT/WTO: Was There Any-
thing to Begin With and is There Anything Left, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 69 
(2005). 
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dies and Countervailing Measures Agreement—“specificity.”12  
III. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
In addition to pioneering economic concepts, Hudec was al-
so the most active advocate of the GATT dispute settlement 
procedure. He defended the balance between diplomacy and 
rule of law created by both aspects of the system. In this re-
gard, I want to highlight two key problems that he identified in 
this transition from GATT to WTO, which remain valid today.  
A. TRANSPARENCY 
Hudec was critical of the current practice and made it clear 
that “the GATT must first remove the excessive blanket of con-
fidentiality that surrounds its law and its legal sources.”13 This 
critic was directed towards the fact that GATT dispute settle-
ment documents kept restricted for a long period of time. Thus, 
Hudec proposed that, “instead of thinking about how to run 
away from the unpleasant legal behavior caused by the public 
attention, the WTO should think about how to manage it.”14  
Hudec went as far as proposing allowing “anyone” to file 
briefs before panels and the Appellate Body.15 Of course, WTO 
Members have not gone that far, although transparency has 
indeed increased substantially over the last years. So far, pa-
nels have held public hearings in fourteen disputes and the 
Appellate Body in eight disputes. Currently, an open hearing 
relating to an aircraft dispute between the United States and 
the European Union is taking place before the Appellate Body.  
WTO has also increased transparency by making public 
most of the dispute settlement documents. The WTO website 
shows many, if not most, of the communications between the 
parties and the Dispute Settlement Body, as well as those be-
tween the parties, and panels, and the Appellate Body.16 Some 
 
 12. Jackson et. al., supra note 3, at 737. 
 11. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An 
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11–14 (1999) 
[hereinafter New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure].  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 48. 
 16. The official WTO dispute settlement documents that may be consulted 
by the public on the WTO official website, see Dispute Settlement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm, and on the WTO 
dispute database, see Find Dispute Documents, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_documents_e.htm, 
inter alia: consultations requests, panel requests, establishment and constitu-
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WTO Members have also made strides to increase transparency 
by making public submissions to Panels and Appellate Body.17 
In fact, Hudec was quite supportive of the first Appellate Body 
report, which authorized the filing of amicus curiae briefs.18  
B. REMEDIES  
Hudec recognized that countries had made good efforts to-
ward increasing compliance and in fact, was “somewhat sur-
prised by the extent of WTO government efforts to comply.”19 
As far as I can tell, Hudec always tried to support his asser-
tions by looking at the empirical data, in other words, he liked 
numbers. I am sure that he will be “somewhat satisfied” to see 
that today only 37% of disputes have reached the panel stage 
and 19% have reached the Appellate Body stage. 
There are two things which caught my attention while 
reading his work. First is his view of the current scheme of 
suspension “of equivalent effect” and the other is the value he 
saw in what he called the ultimate “remedy,” i.e., “community 
pressure.” 
Regarding the first aspect, throughout his work, he looked 
at the economic aspect of the suspension of benefits and con-
cluded that the economic rationale of suspending benefits of 
equivalent effect was actually a “fiction” because he believes 
that the country imposing the remedy would not gain anything 
by raising trade barriers and that the “act usually inflicts a net 
loss upon its own citizens even though most of its citizens are 
not aware of that.”20 Moreover, he identified the forward-
 
tion of panels, most communications from the chairperson of panels to the par-
ties, preliminary rulings and final reports. There are other documents that are 
by nature confidential such as the series of slates of suggested panellists that 
are sent by the WTO Secretariat to the parties during the constitution of pan-
els and, most importantly, the interim report. The Appellate Body, in turn, 
also makes public the notices of appeal and other appeal, preliminary rulings, 
and the Appellate Body reports. 
 17. Certain independent, private websites, such as 
www.worldtradelaw.net and www.tradelawguide.com, have also helped en-
hance transparency by providing analytical and thematic access to WTO dis-
pute settlement documents. 
 18. See Hudec, supra note 14, at 47. 
 19. Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of 
the World Trade Organization, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 211, 213 (2002). 
 20. Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUE 
& LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS & 
TRIBUNALS 388 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000). 
RAMIREZ - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:21 PM 
270 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
looking character of WTO remedies as a problem and criticized 
the fact that “there is no compensation for the economic harms 
done by the legal violation.”21  
It is interesting that in one of his articles, Hudec mentions 
a proposal submitted by developing countries during the Uru-
guay Round Negotiations seeking “monetary damages” as a 
remedy for violations.22 It would be difficult to imagine that he 
would have had any objection, not only because of his concerns 
regarding the existing remedies, but also and most important-
ly, because he firmly believed in the rights of developing coun-
tries.23  
Today, members have tabled proposals to improve reme-
dies in the context of the DSU review negotiations. Some of the 
proposals, including the one mentioned by Professor Hudec re-
lated to the right of a complaining party to seek monetary 
damages for a WTO violation, seek to expand the scope of re-
medies.24  
Finally, one can only acknowledge Professor Hudec’s in-
sightfulness in looking at things from two angles. On one hand, 
he criticizes this “equivalent effect”-standard of trade remedies, 
but on the other hand, he recognized, referring to the GATT 
 
 21. Id. at 399. 
 22.  Id. at 383. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Text for the Afri-
can Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations: 
Communication from Kenya, TN/DS/W/42 (Jan. 24, 2003). For instance, 
Kenya's proposal to amend Article 22.8 of the DSU to state: "[w]here injury 
has resulted from the withdrawn measure, and if the developing or least-
developed country Member so requests, the DSB may recommend monetary 
and any other appropriate compensation taking into account the nature of in-
jury suffered." A similar proposal was submitted by Haiti and by the group of 
least-developed countries. See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, 
Text for LDC Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations: 
Communication from Haiti, TN/DS/W/37 (Jan. 22, 2003); Special Session of 
the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiation on the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing: Proposal by the LDC Group, TN/DS/W/17 (Oct. 9, 2002). Ecuador has 
in turn proposed an amendment to Article 22.2 of the DSU, adding the follow-
ing sentence: "[s]uch compensation may be partly or entirely monetary." See 
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiation on Improvements 
and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by Ec-
uador, TN/DS/W/33 (Jan. 23, 2003). Mexico, for its part, has suggested that 
Article 22.2 of the DSU be amended to read, in relevant part: "[c]ompensation 
to developing country Members will be monetary unless otherwise agreed 
(note 1)." See Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Improvements 
and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by Mex-
ico, TN/DS/W/91 (Jul. 16, 2007).  
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dispute settlement system, that the “ultimate” remedy was 
something beyond a legal obligation, something he called 
“community pressure.”  
I am not able to nor in the position to characterize or to la-
bel the reasons why countries complied with WTO rulings. The 
only thing I can do, as Professor Hudec did many times, is to 
look at the empirical data. In particular, out of 418 disputes in-
itiated only seventeen have received authorization from the 
DSB to suspend benefits - that is, only 4%.  
IV. THE APPELLATE BODY  
Finally, we’ve come to the complicated part of my presenta-
tion: Professor Hudec’s take on the Appellate Body.  
As many of you certainly are aware, Professor Hudec’s 
romance with the Appellate Body can be divided into two parts. 
As any good novel or soap opera, it started with hate and it 
ended with love. The hate episode started with Professor Hu-
dec’s strong opposition to the whole idea of creating an appel-
late tribunal.25 The first thing he questioned was the number of 
obstacles to making high-quality legal decisions.26 As he points 
out, good panel reports would be subject to mediocre appellate 
proceedings.27  
The other cause of opposition raised by Professor Hudec 
was more a systemic one. As a firm believer of the current 
GATT dispute settlement system, he had serious doubts re-
garding the transformation of the WTO system into a quasi-
judicial system.28 Hudec believed that the only way for this new 
system to work was if governments were prepared to abide by it 
and he had some doubts that this could actually happen.29  
Alas, Professor Hudec had the opportunity of looking at no 
more than twenty Appellate Body reports, but it is clear that 
this was enough for him to become a believer of this institution. 
Professor Hudec considered that the Appellate Body was “se-
curely established and functioning well.”30  
 
 25.  R. Hudec, The Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 116 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias 
Hirsch eds., 1998). 
 26. Id. at 116-20 
 27. Id. 
 28.  See New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, supra note 14, at 11–14 
 29. Id.. 
 30. New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, supra note 14, at 33. 
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In one article which may well be the best example of Pro-
fessor Hudec’s honesty, leaving aside any consideration on 
whether the Appellate Body agreed with his legal views, Pro-
fessor Hudec stated that “the substance of the first dozen Ap-
pellate Body decisions rendered during the first three years has 
been viewed by governments as competent, conservative and 
‘responsible.’”31  
In fact, he believed so much in this new institution that he 
went beyond mere praise and proposed to eliminate the panel 
stage and increase the Appellate Body membership to nine full-
time members.32 Another more practical proposal he made was 
to increase the amount of time for the Appellate Body to issue 
its decisions from sixty to ninety days.33 Due to the complexity 
and size of the cases, the Appellate Body has regularly used the 
ninety-day maximum in the DSU.34  
Maybe what Professor Hudec anticipated was that as gen-
eral familiarity with WTO rules and complexity of disputes 
grow, so will the amount of claims and arguments made by par-
ticipants. To give an example, the two disputes currently before 
the Appellate Body involve panel reports of around 500 and 
1,000 pages respectively.35  
Finally, the major substantial change Professor Hudec 
proposed was to grant the Appellate Body the power to remand 
its findings to panels. Members have already identified this is-
sue in the context of the DSU negotiations and have put for-
ward proposals to address it.36  
 
 31. Id. at 31. 
 32. See id. at 33. 
 33. See id. at 31–32. 
 34. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 17.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (“In no case shall the 
proceedings exceed 90 days.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European 
Communities and its Member States to the improvement and clarification of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/38 (Jan. 23, 2003) 
(proposing to amend DSU Article 17.12 and add an Article 17bis), and  
Dispute Settlement Body, Jordan’s Further Contribution Towards the Im-
provement and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
TN/DS/W/56 (May 19, 2003) (proposing to add an Article 17bis to account for 
remand procedures). 
 36. See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Dis-
tribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009), and Panel Report, European Commun-
ities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30, 2010). 
RAMIREZ - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:21 PM 
2011] PROFESSOR HUDEC AND THE APPELLATE BODY 273 
 
Overall, Hudec identified what in my view, are two of the 
four pillars on which the Appellate Body stands. After my still 
short residence in the Appellate Body, I am convinced that the 
institutional four pillars are integration, collegiality, Members’ 
trust, and the quality of its support staff.  
As to integration, I think the Appellate Body attributes 
should be measured in terms equivalent to the ample expe-
rience of its members. The seven Members come from different 
professional, academic, and cultural backgrounds. This gives 
the Appellate Body great force in looking at every issue from 
very different angles  
This integration is only strengthened by the rule on colle-
giality, whereby the Division hearing the case will exchange 
views with the other four members. Again, as Hudec would 
have looked at it, out of seventy-eight reports, so far there have 
only been two dissents and two concurring opinions.  
The next aspect is one which Hudec identified as a prere-
quisite to the success or not of this new body and that is the 
trust of the WTO Membership. The best empirical data on this 
is my own experience, during my interview process with each 
WTO Member. There it became clear to me the value and sup-
port the membership has in this institution.  
Last, but not least, another pillar identified by Professor 
Hudec was the need for the Appellate Body to be well-assisted 
by the WTO. In this regard, we are quite fortunate to be sup-
ported by a group of eleven extraordinary lawyers, all of whom 
greatly facilitate our task.  
I am sure that, as he predicted, “a small army of academic 
lawyers and well-published practicing lawyers [such as the 
ones I see today] are already gathering around the Appellate 
Body’s work product, with sharpened pencils in hand.”37 We 
welcome that. The Appellate Body will not discuss its reports 
but will always listen to the views, comments, and critiques of 
others. 
Certainly Professor Hudec’s voice will always be heard. As 
I hope I could express to some extent here today, his legacy 
should not be denied or forgotten. He “transcended the ostensi-
ble” and has become a vital reference to any “honest” interna-
tional trade expert.38  
 
 37. New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, supra note 14, at 29. 
 38.  Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on 
the Nature of Litigation Between Governments 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 226 
(1987). 
